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Abstract Ambiguity aversion appears to have subtle psychological causes. Curley,
Yates, and Abrams found that the fear of negative evaluation by others (FNE)
increases ambiguity aversion. This paper introduces a design in which preferences
can be private information of individuals, so that FNE can be avoided entirely. Thus,
we can completely control for FNE and other social factors, and can determine
exactly to what extent ambiguity aversion is driven by such social factors. In our
experiment ambiguity aversion, while appearing as commonly found in the presence
of FNE, disappears entirely if FNE is eliminated. Implications are discussed.
Keywords Ambiguity aversion . Fear of negative evaluation . Home-bias
JEL classification C91, D81, Z13
In decision under uncertainty people have been found to prefer options involving
clear probabilities (risk) to options involving vague probabilities (ambiguity), even if
normative theory (Savage 1954) implies indifference. This phenomenon is called
ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg 1961). Ambiguity aversion has been shown to be
economically relevant and to persist in experimental market settings (Gilboa 2004;
Sarin and Weber 1993) and among business owners and managers familiar with
decisions under uncertainty (Chesson and Viscusi 2003). People are often willing to
spend significant amounts of money to avoid ambiguous processes in favor of
normatively equivalent risky processes (Becker and Brownson 1964; Chow and
Sarin 2001; Keren and Gerritsen 1999).
Curley et al. (1986) found that increasing the number of people watching a
decision enhanced ambiguity aversion, and enhanced it more than other factors that
they manipulated. The relevance of evaluations by others is supported by Fox and
J Risk Uncertainty (2008) 36:225–243
DOI 10.1007/s11166-008-9038-9
S. T. Trautmann : F. M. Vieider : P. P. Wakker (*)
Econometric Institute, Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, Rotterdam 3000, The Netherlands
e-mail: Wakker@few.eur.nl
URL: http://www.few.eur.nl/few/people/wakker/
Tversky (1998), Fox and Weber (2002), and Heath and Tversky (1991), showing
that ambiguity aversion increases with the perception that others are more competent
and more knowledgeable. If people choose an ambiguous option and receive a bad
outcome, then they fear criticisms by others. Such criticisms are easier to counter
after a risky choice, when a bad outcome is more easily explained as bad luck, than
after an ambiguous choice. This explains the enhanced ambiguity aversion. We will
call such social effects fear of negative evaluation (FNE), borrowing a term from
psychology (Watson and Friend 1969). A detailed review of the literature on FNE
for ambiguity will be presented in Section 1.
The studies of ambiguity aversion available in the literature so far could not
determine the extent to which ambiguity aversion can exist beyond FNE. It was
always clear what the preferred outcomes were and this information was public for
the experimenter and others, so that subjects could always be criticized if they
received a bad outcome. We introduce a design where preferences between outcomes
are the subjects’ private information that cannot be known to the experimenter or to
other people unless the subjects explicitly reveal it. Thus, we can completely control
the presence or absence of FNE, and we can exactly determine the effect of the
corresponding social factors on ambiguity aversion.
In our main experiment, the stimuli are two DVDs that, on average, are equally
popular but between which most individuals have strong preferences. These
preferences are unknown to others, in particular to the experimenter. Subjects
choose between a risky prospect and an ambiguous prospect to win one of the two
DVDs. With preferences between the DVDs unobservable, the decision maker
cannot be judged negatively by the experimenter or others because only the decision
maker knows what the winning and what the losing outcome is. Remarkably,
eliminating the possibility of evaluation by others makes ambiguity aversion
disappear entirely in our experiment. Introducing the possibility of evaluation by
letting subjects announce their preference between the DVDs before they make their
choice is sufficient to make ambiguity aversion reemerge as strongly as is commonly
found. Thus, our finding adds to the aforementioned studies showing how important
social factors are for ambiguity aversion.
A research question resulting from our study is to what extent ambiguity aversion
can exist at all in the absence of FNE, that is, to what extent it is at all a phenomenon
of individual decision making. Most of the theories popular today use individual
decision models to analyze ambiguity attitudes.
To provide psychological background for our finding, we did another experiment
with the classical Ellsberg urn and with traditional monetary outcomes, where we
additionally measured subjects’ sensitivity to FNE using Leary’s (1983) scale. We
indeed found a positive correlation between this scale and ambiguity aversion,
confirming our interpretations.
Empirically, many economic phenomena deviating from traditional rational
choice theory have been attributed to ambiguity aversion (Camerer and Weber
1992; Gilboa 2004; Mukerji and Tallon 2001). A famous example is the home bias
in consumption and financial investment (French and Poterba 1991). Implications of
our findings regarding FNE for such phenomena will be discussed in Section 5.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the FNE hypothesis
and its literature. Section 2 presents a replication of the Curley et al. (1986) result
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and discusses the role of hypothetical choice for ambiguity. The main experiment
and a discussion of its results are in Section 3. Section 4 considers the role of FNE as
a personality trait for ambiguity aversion. Section 5 discusses theoretical and
empirical implications. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1 Literature on the fear of negative evaluation
A central point in the explanation of ambiguity aversion concerns the perceived
informational content of the outcome generating process. People shy away from
processes about which they think they have insufficient information (Frisch and
Baron 1988). This happens in particular if an alternative process with a higher
perceived informational content is available (Chow and Sarin 2001; Fox and
Tversky 1995; Fox and Weber 2002). The effect appears to be particularly strong
when somebody with a higher knowledge of the outcome generating process may
serve as a comparison (Heath and Tversky 1991; Taylor 1995) or observes the
decision (Chow and Sarin 2002). In Ellsberg’s (1961) example the effect leads to
preference for the urn with a known probability of winning, about which subjects
feel more knowledgeable.
A preference for the more informative process may be explained by fear of
negative evaluation, which is driven by the expectation that one’s actions or
judgments may be difficult to justify in front of others. When the audience’s views
on an issue are unknown and no prior commitment to one course of action exists,
people have been found to make the decision which they deem most easily
justifiable to others rather than the one that is intrinsically optimal (Shafir et al.
1993; Simonson 1989; Lerner and Tetlock 1999). In this way they minimize the risk
of being judged negatively by others on their quality as decision makers.
Choosing the unfamiliar process entailed by the ambiguous urn may lead to
embarrassment if a losing outcome should obtain (Ellsberg 1963; Fellner 1961;
Heath and Tversky 1991; Roberts 1963; Tetlock 1991; Toda and Shuford 1965). The
risky prospect is perceived as more justifiable than the ambiguous one because
potentially available probabilistic information is missing from the ambiguous urn
(Frisch and Baron 1988). This is consistent with people’s preference for betting on
future events rather than on past events, given that information about past events is
potentially available whereas the future has yet to materialize (Brun and Teigen
1990; Rothbart and Snyder 1970). It is also consistent with people’s unwillingness to
act on the basis of ambiguous information (van Dijk and Zeelenberg 2003).
A decision based on more information is generally perceived as better (Tetlock and
Boettger 1989), and it has been shown that a risky prospect is generally considered
preferable to an ambiguous one by a majority of people (Keren and Gerritsen 1999).
Kocher and Trautmann (2007) find that people correctly anticipate these negative
attitudes towards ambiguity. If a bad outcome were to result from a prospect about
which an agent had comparatively little knowledge, her failure may be blamed on
her incompetence or ‘uninformed’ choice (Baron and Hershey 1988). A bad
outcome resulting from a risky prospect, on the other hand, cannot be attributed to
poor judgment. All possible information about the risky prospect was known, and a
failure is simply bad luck (Heath and Tversky 1991; Toda and Shuford 1965).
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FNE is difficult to eliminate completely, because people naturally expect to make
their choices in a social context. This may explain the pervasiveness of ambiguity
aversion. Curley et al. (1986) found that letting more people observe the decision
increased ambiguity aversion. To determine to what extent ambiguity aversion can
exist beyond FNE, however, FNE should be completely eliminated. This will be
achieved in our main experiment (Experiment 2). First, however, we present an
experiment that replicates the findings of Curley et al. (1986) in a slightly different
setup, and that shows that FNE also can arise with hypothetical choice.
2 Experiment 1: Increasing other-evaluation
Unless stated otherwise, tests will be one-sided in this paper because there usually is
a clear direction of prediction with a one-sided alternative hypothesis. All results in
this paper based on t-tests do not change if we use non-parametric Fisher tests
instead. So as to be comparable to many traditional studies, and to illustrate the role
of FNE there, we use hypothetical payoffs in this first experiment. We will make the
ambiguous option more desirable so as to make indifferent subjects choose this
option. Questionnaires with a simple Ellsberg choice task were distributed to 41
students in a classroom setting. The students were asked to make a simple choice
between two hypothetical prospects. One, the risky prospect, gave them a 0.5 chance
to win €15 and nothing otherwise. The second, the ambiguous prospect, gave them
an ambiguous chance to win €16 and nothing otherwise. The higher outcome for the
ambiguous prospect makes it more desirable than the risky prospect. The choice task
was described as a classical Ellsberg two-color bet in which subjects could first
choose the color on which they wanted to bet and then the urn from which they
wanted to draw (instructions in the Appendix).
Nineteen subjects obtained instructions to write down their name and email address
prior to taking the decision, with the explanation that they may be contacted by a
member of the economics department and asked for explanations regarding their
choice (high other-evaluation). Twenty-two subjects were not asked for any personal
information before making their choice (low other-evaluation). Of the 19 subjects in
the high other-evaluation condition, 15 chose the risky prospect (79%). Of the 22
subjects in the low other-evaluation condition, 11 chose the risky prospect (50%). The
difference between the two treatments is significant (t39=−1.96, p=0.029).
In general, ambiguity aversion is high in both treatments, especially in view of the
higher desirability of the ambiguous option. It should be noted that, even with
hypothetical questionnaires and low other-evaluation, FNE is still not completely
eliminated because people still imagine making a decision in a social situation
(announce a color, draw a chip, receive a prize). Even imagined social encounters
have been shown to be sufficient to induce embarrassment and FNE (Dahl et al.
2001; Miller and Leary 1992). In this framework, the thought of losing in front of
others with the ambiguous urn may thus be enough to produce ambiguity aversion in
hypothetical studies as well. Thus, in no experiment on ambiguity attitude in the
literature known to us, could FNE be completely eliminated. In the next experiment
we will completely eliminate FNE by explicitly making the subjects’ preferences,
and therefore the success of their decision, private information.
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3 Experiment 2 (Main experiment): Known versus unknown preferences
3.1 Experimental design
Subjects N=140 subjects participated in individual sessions, 94 from the University
of Amsterdam in The Netherlands and 46 from Erasmus University Rotterdam in
The Netherlands. Most of these students studied economics or business.
Payoffs Subjects would always win one of two DVDs worth €7. They were not told
the price of the DVDs. In two treatments subjects could earn up to €0.80 in addition
to the DVD. All payoffs depended on subjects’ choices and were paid for real.
The two DVDs were About a Boy and Catch Me if You Can. This pair was chosen
in a preliminary survey among 50 students at the University of Maastricht because
most students had a strong preference between them, but there was no difference in
social desirability and no difference by gender, which made preferences unpredict-
able. On a scale from 3 (strongly prefer About a Boy) to −3 (strongly prefer Catch
Me if You Can), 70% of the subjects indicated a preference greater than or equal to 2
in absolute value. Twenty percent had a preference of 1 or −1, and 10% were
indifferent. The mean absolute preference was 1.74. Catch Me if You Can was
slightly preferred overall (mean=−0.82).
Procedure We offered subjects a choice between a risky and an ambiguous prospect
to win one of the two DVDs. A detailed description of the lottery mechanism is
given later. We conducted four treatments that differed with respect to the
experimenter’s knowledge of the subjects’ preference between the two DVDs and
to whether there was a price difference between the risky and the ambiguous
prospect (the ambiguous card was 50 cents cheaper). Table 1 shows the organization
of the four treatments. It also indicates the total number of subjects in each treatment
and in parentheses the number of students from Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Treatment KS replicates the classic Ellsberg (1961) example with known
preference and a simple choice between the risky and the ambiguous prospect. At
the beginning of the instructions the subjects were asked to decide which movie they
wanted to win and to write down the name of the movie in front of the experimenter.
Treatment US introduces unobserved preferences between the two prizes, which is
the novelty of our design. It also requires a simple choice of the prospect. At the
beginning of the instructions subjects were asked to decide which movie they
wanted to win but not to tell the experimenter about their preference. The
instructions are in the Appendix. The remainder of the instructions were identical
for both treatments.
Table 1 Treatments
Same price Ambiguous card 50c Cheaper
Known preference Treatment KS [N=40(21)] Treatment KC [N=30(2)]
Unknown preference Treatment US [N=40(20)] Treatment UC [N=30(3)]
KS Known preference with Same price (i.e., the cell in the second column and the second row); KC, US,
and UC refer to the other cells.
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In Treatment KC we endowed subjects with €10 from which they had to buy either
the risky prospect for €9.70 or the ambiguous prospect for €9.20, making the ambiguous
choice 50 cents cheaper. They were allowed to keep the rest of the money. Preferences
were known (same instructions as in Treatment KS). In Treatment UC the ambiguous
prospect was again 50 cents cheaper (same instructions here as in Treatment KC) and
preferences were unknown (same instructions here as in Treatment US). These two
treatments were included to measure the economic significance of the ambiguity
aversion, and to exclude the possibility that many subjects had been indifferent between
all prospects and had chosen on the basis of minor psychological cues.
After deciding which DVD they wanted to win and writing it down or keeping the
information to themselves depending on the treatment, subjects chose the prospect
(paying for it in Treatments KC and UC) and played it at once. They immediately
received the DVD they won. They always received one DVD. Then they filled out a
background questionnaire and were dismissed.
The questionnaire contained demographic background questions, asked about the
ex-post preferred movie (in Treatments US and UC with ex-ante unknown
preference), and included some questions about the subject’s perception of the game
and the valuation difference between the two DVDs. The valuation difference was
elicited as the subject’s maximum willingness-to-pay to exchange her less preferred
DVD for her more preferred DVD. It served again to verify that the subjects had
clear preferences between the DVDs.
Lottery mechanism The lotteries were conducted as follows. First, the subjects assigned
a symbol X to one DVD and a symbol O to the other at their own discretion. Then they
chose to draw a card from one of two stacks, one representing the risky prospect and the
other one the ambiguous prospect. Each stack consisted of about 50 cards. Each card had
six numbers on its back, corresponding to the sides of a six-sided die. Next to each
number there was either a symbol X or O. In the risky prospect the subjects knew that
there were exactly three Xs and three Os on the back of each card. In the ambiguous
prospect they did not know the number of Xs and Os on cards, and they only knew that
there were between zero and six Xs and a complementary number of Os on each card.
Within each stack, cards differed with respect to the actual location of the symbols
over the six numbers, and the cards of the ambiguous prospect also differed in the
number of Xs and Os. After having freely drawn a card from either the risky stack with
exactly three Xs and three Os on each card, or from the ambiguous stack with an
unknown composition of symbols, subjects observed the back of their card and threw a
six-sided die to determine which DVD they had won. They always got one DVD.
The mechanism just described was chosen to make the process as transparent to
the subjects as possible, and to make clear that the experimenter had no influence
on the outcome of either prospect. The latter holds the more so as the subjects
attached the two symbols to the two DVDs at their own discretion.
3.2 Results
In an experiment where both prizes are DVDs, indifference between the two
outcomes of the prospect is possible and did occur for some subjects (details on the
measurement of indifference are given in the Appendix). This section presents the
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results including all data. Excluding indifferences from the analysis does not
qualitatively change the results (see Appendix).
Table 2 summarizes the results of the four treatments. It shows the percentage of
subjects choosing the unambiguous prospect.
In Treatment KS significantly more than half of the subjects chose the risky
prospect over the ambiguous prospect. We, thus, find ambiguity aversion, in
agreement with common findings. Making preference private information in
Treatment US eliminates ambiguity aversion. Here, we find that significantly less
than half of the subjects chose the risky prospect. The difference in risky choices
between Treatment KS and Treatment US is significant (t78=3.04, p=0.0016).
In Treatment KC subjects were, on average, indifferent between the risky prospect
and the ambiguous prospect plus 50 cents. The number of subjects who chose the
risky prospect is not significantly different from 50%. In Treatment UC with a
cheaper ambiguous card and unknown preference only 17% chose the risky
prospect. The difference in risky choices between Treatment KC and Treatment
UC is significant (t58=2.32, p=0.0121).
The average valuation difference between the two DVDs was €2.19. There was
no significant effect of known versus unknown preference on valuation differences.
Running a probit regression of the effect of unknown preference and price difference
on the probability that subjects choose the risky prospect shows that the effect of known
versus unknown preference is highly significant (regression I in Table 3).
The marginal effect of a (discrete) change from known to unknown preference is
an approximate 31 percentage-point reduction in the probability of choosing the
risky card. The marginal effect of a 50 cents price reduction for the ambiguous card
is an approximate 20 percentage-point reduction in the probability of choosing the
risky card. Regressions II and III in Table 3 show that the size and the significance of
the effect of unknown preference is stable if we control for gender, age and valuation
difference. Valuation differences do not affect ambiguity attitude. Regressions IV and
V show that the interaction of unknown preference and price and the interaction of
indifference between the DVDs and price are insignificant.
Analyses of the questionnaire that the subjects filled out after the experiment
corroborate our findings. Subjects in the unknown preference condition were asked
ex-post about their preference between the two DVDs. Of those who had chosen the
ambiguous prospect and were not indifferent between the DVDs, significantly more
than half claimed to have won the DVD they preferred (p=0.04, binomial test). No
Table 2 Percentage of risky choices
Same price Ambiguous Card 50c Cheaper
Known preference Treatment KS
65% chose risky card (>50%, p=0.04)
Treatment KC
43% chose risky card (not significant)
Unknown preference Treatment US
33% chose risky card (<50%, p=0.019)
Treatment UC
17% chose risky card (<50%, p=0.0002)
Tests are binomial.
KS: Known preference with Same price; KC, US, and UC refer to the other cells.
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such effect was found for those who had chosen the risky prospect. See part a) of
Table 4.
Subjects in the unknown preference condition were also asked ex-post whether
the experimenter could have correctly guessed which movie they preferred. Those
who had chosen the risky prospect were significantly more likely to think that the
experimenter could have guessed their preference than those who had chosen the
ambiguous prospect (t66=−2.33, p=0.0115). See part b) of Table 4.
Table 3 Probit regression over all four treatments
Probit Dependent variable: choice of risky prospect
I II III IV V
Unknown −0.3091
(0.0798)**
−0.3204
(0.0806)**
−0.3218
(0.0924)**
−0.3401
(0.1046)**
−0.3160
(0.0808)**
Price −0.2019
(0.0832)*
−0.2077
(0.084)*
−0.1548
(0.1064)
−0.23
(0.1131)*
−0.1899
(0.0871)*
Valuation difference
(ex-post)
0.0254
(0.0215)
Unknown × price 0.0531
(0.184)
Indifferent × price −0.1861
(0.2034)
Controls (gender, age) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 140 139 110 139 139
The table reports marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses; × interaction; one subject did not
indicate age; 15 subjects in Treatments KC and UC had no valuation question.
*Significant at the 5% level
**Significant at the 1% level, two-sided
Table 4 Analysis of ex-post questions
a) Won movie
Ambiguous chosen Risky chosen
A C A C
Preferred A 13 5 4 2
Movie C 9 13 4 4
A: About a Boy; C: Catch Me if You Can.
b)
Ambiguous Risky
Think that experimenter could
guess preference
No 47 12
Yes 4 5
The numbers refer to numbers of subjects.
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3.3 Discussion of the experimental results of the main experiment
3.3.1 The relevance of fear of negative evaluation
The experimental results show that making preferences unknown to the experimenter
leads to a 30 percentage-point reduction of ambiguity averse choices and makes
ambiguity aversion disappear. In the current framework with valuation differences
between the two prizes of about €2.20, this effect is stronger than the effect of
making the ambiguous option 50 cents cheaper. This finding demonstrates that FNE
has not only statistical but also economic significance.
In Treatment US we find a majority of subjects choosing the ambiguous option.
With other-evaluation eliminated there may be no clear reason to choose either of the
two stacks of cards and subjects may look for other minor psychological cues.
Curiosity about the symbol distribution of the card of the ambiguous prospect or utility
of gambling may lead to the preference for the ambiguous prospect. In Treatments KC
and UC, however, the price difference provides a clear cue for how to choose in the
case of ambiguity neutrality. There is a significant effect of unknown preference in the
comparison of these two treatments. Significantly more subjects were willing to incur
the monetary cost to avoid the ambiguous prospect if preferences were known than if
they were not known to the experimenter. In Treatment KC with known preferences, a
considerable proportion of the subjects were ready to pay 50 cents, or about 23% of the
average valuation difference, in order to use the risky prospect instead of the
ambiguous one. In Treatment UC with unknown preferences the proportion of
subjects ready to forego 50 cents for the risky prospect was considerably smaller.
The probit regression results show that the effect of making preferences private
information is stable if we introduce other covariates. Including valuation differ-
ences, gender or age does not have an effect on the size or significance of the
parameter for unknown preference.
Further evidence supporting the importance of FNE comes from the ex-post
behavior of the subjects in the unknown preference condition. If they had chosen the
ambiguous prospect, then they afterwards claimed that they were successful in
winning their preferred DVD much more often than would be expected in a prospect
with equal chances to win either DVD. This is not the case for those who had chosen
the risky option. This finding suggests that losing after playing the ambiguous
prospect is more embarrassing than after playing a 50–50 prospect. Kitayama et al.
(2004) suggested that such ex-post justifications are motivated primarily by social
evaluations. Such phenomena are known as cognitive bolstering in studies on the
effects of accountability on decision making (Tetlock 1983). The ex-post behavior,
therefore, further supports the FNE hypothesis.
We also find that subjects who had chosen the risky option were more likely to
think that the experimenter could have guessed their preference. This indicates once
more that there is a relation between ambiguity avoidance and the presumed
possibility to be evaluated by others, again supporting FNE.
Given the overall evidence for the importance of known versus unknown
preference in our experiment and the ex-post behavioral differences between subjects
who chose the ambiguous and the risky prospect, FNE appears to be a major cause
of ambiguity aversion, and in our experiment it even seems to be a necessary
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condition. We next discuss some alternative explanations and argue that they are less
convincing as an explanation of the data than FNE.
3.3.2 Alternative explanations
Indifference It could be suggested that the subjects were mostly indifferent between
prospects, and that majority choices resulted from minor psychological cues. This
suggestion can be ruled out in our experiment because of the price differences
between the Treatments KS and US versus KC and UC. In particular, indifference
between the DVDs must imply a clear preference for the ambiguous prospect in the
treatments where the latter is made cheaper.
It could be suggested that writing down the preferred DVD in Treatments KS and
KC reinforced subjects’ preference for that DVD. Then subjects in Treatments US
and UC, who were not asked to write down their preference, might have had weaker
preferences, closer to indifference. This could then have led to less ambiguity
aversion. This suggestion can be ruled out for our experiment. First, we find that the
valuation difference is not different for unknown or known preference, indicating no
difference in strength of preference. Second, the insignificant effect of valuation
differences in the probit indicates that there is no effect of strength of preference on
ambiguity attitude. Also, inclusion of valuation differences does not affect the strong
effect of unknown preference either in size or in significance. These results hold for
both the data with and without indifferences.
Additional evidence against weaker preferences in the unknown preference
treatments comes from the interaction between the preference and price manipulation
(probit regression Table 3.IV). If subjects in the unknown preference conditions
have weaker preferences between the DVDs than those in the known preference
conditions, introducing the monetary incentive to choose the ambiguous prospect
should have a stronger effect on choice in the unknown preference conditions.
Subjects without a clear preference do not face a trade-off between ambiguity and
money. The indifference explanation therefore predicts a negative effect of the
interaction of ‘unknown’ and ‘price’ on the probability to choose the risky
prospect in regression IV. We observe that the interaction effect is slightly positive
and insignificant. As a control, including the interaction of indifferent subjects
with ‘price’ in regression V, we do find a negative effect on the probability of the
risky choice as expected. However, owing to the small number of indifferent
subjects the effect is not significant. We conclude that the indifference hypotheses
cannot hold.
Fear of manipulation Fear of manipulation can be a reason for subjects to avoid the
ambiguous prospect if they think the experimenter has an interest in reducing their
probability of winning (Ellsberg 1961; Viscusi and Magat 1992; Zeckhauser 1986).
Morris (1997) suggested that experimental subjects mistakenly apply strategic
considerations appropriate in the real world and reduce their willingness to bet
against the experimenter if probabilities are ambiguous. In footnote 24 he wrote: “It
would be interesting to test how sensitive Ellsberg-paradox-type phenomena are to
varying emphasis in the experimental designs on the experimenter’s incentives.”
This paper presents such a test. In our experiment subjects knew they would always
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win a DVD, and there was no gain from manipulation for the experimenter. The
lottery mechanism provided subjects with a choice of how to attach symbols to
DVDs, and subjects always had to throw a die to determine the winning outcome.
This made it very transparent that the experimenter had no interest and no possibility
to influence the outcome.
Self-evaluation It might be argued that self-evaluation and anticipated cognitive
dissonance or regret are the reason for the observed effect. In other words, the
negative evaluation to be feared is not the evaluation by others but the evaluation by
oneself. Self-evaluation was tested by Curley et al. (1986) and was found not to be
significant. In our experiment self-evaluation should be the same in the known and
the unknown preference treatments. The subject always knows whether she lost or
won the prospect, and feedback was the same in all treatments. Hence, no difference
between the treatments should then have been found. We conclude, therefore, that
self-evaluation cannot account for our findings.
4 Experiment 3: Ambiguity aversion and fear of negative evaluation
as a personality trait
The results presented so far suggest that FNE makes subjects shy away from the
ambiguous option when a risky option is available. This interpretation implies that
people who are more sensitive to negative evaluation by others (Leary 1983; Watson
and Friend 1969) should show stronger ambiguity aversion. In order to test this
assumption, we invited 63 subjects for a paid experiment. In the first part of the
study subjects filled out an unrelated questionnaire on health insurance and food
safety for which they were paid €10. At the end of the questionnaire we included
Leary’s (1983) 12-item FNE scale.
After completion of the questionnaire the subjects were given an Ellsberg two-
color choice task, which they would play for real money with the possibility of
winning another €15 (instructions in the Appendix). This choice task was framed as
a second, distinct experiment. Subjects were invited in groups of between four and
six persons, and were told that their decisions would be read aloud by the
experimenter and played out in front of the group. Subjects made a straight choice
between the risky and the ambiguous option and gave their maximum willingness-
to-pay (WTP; hypothetical) for both options.
Of the 63 subjects who took part in the experiment, 46 (73%) chose the risky urn,
resulting in high ambiguity aversion (>50%, p=0.0002, binomial test). The median
of the Leary FNE score was 37 on a scale from 12 (low) to 60 (high), and
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.87. The average WTP difference between the risky and the
ambiguous urn (WTP risky option minus WTP ambiguous option) was €2.11.
A probit regression of choices on the FNE score and demographic controls
gives an average marginal increase in the probability of an ambiguity averse
choice of 1.1 percentage points per unit of the score, which is marginally
significant (p=0.076). A linear regression of the WTP difference on the FNE score
and demographic controls gives an average increase of 7.3 cents per unit of the score
(p=0.026).
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Table 5 illustrates the effect of the median split. The group that is more sensitive
to negative evaluation with an average FNE score of 41.97 has an average WTP
difference of €2.91. The less sensitive group with an average FNE score of 29 has an
average WTP difference of €1.28. This difference is both statistically and
economically significant for two prospects with an expected value of €7.50 (t61=
−3.04, p=0.0018). The percentage of ambiguity averse choices is 10.4 percentage
points higher in the high-FNE-sensitivity group, but this difference is not significant
(t61=−0.92, p=0.1807).
For the low FNE group we observe a moderate but positive WTP difference and a
majority of ambiguity averse choices. However, with a score of 29 this group is still
far from being immune to other-evaluation, and they were facing the possibility of
missing the €15 prize in front of a group of other students. We would therefore
expect FNE to matter for this group as well in the experiment. Taken together the
results show that people who are less sensitive to evaluation by others are less
ambiguity averse. This finding supports the FNE hypothesis.
5 Implications of FNE
Empirically, the role of FNE has implications for economic phenomena that are
affected by ambiguity aversion. A well-known example is the home bias in
consumption and finance (French and Poterba 1991; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000):
people tend to invest and trade more in their own country than would be expected
given the gains from international diversification. Transportation costs, capital
controls, or other tangible institutional factors cannot explain the empirically
observed size of the home bias. A number of authors have argued that the home bias
can be explained by ambiguity aversion (Huang 2007; Kasa 2000; Kilka and Weber
2000; Uppal and Wang 2003). Geographically remote trade or investment
opportunities are more unfamiliar to people and involve more ambiguity than local
opportunities. People feel less knowledgeable about the more distant option.
FNE theory predicts different long-term stability of the bias in trade than in finance.
Success or failure in trade will remain highly observable in the future, and the home
bias in entrepreneurial decisions is therefore likely to be persistent. On the other hand,
the propagation of technology generates a more anonymous and impersonal decision
environment in finance (online brokerage, etc.). This is likely to reduce ambiguity
aversion, and therefore the home bias, in the long run. The differential prediction for
goods and equity markets is consistent with empirical evidence (Huang 2007; Tesar
and Werner 1998). Additionally, we would expect that highly observable investments
of otherwise large and sophisticated investors are more prone to home bias. Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2000, p. 359) cite some evidence for this effect.
Table 5 Median split
Number of
observations
Average FNE score
(min 12, max 60)
Average WTP
difference
Percentage of ambiguity
averse choices (%)
Low FNE sensitivity 31 29 €1.28 67.7
High FNE sensitivity 32 41.97 €2.91 78.1
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In our experiments we manipulated other-evaluation in simple laboratory decision
tasks. It would be interesting to study the effect in naturally occurring environments.
Online brokerage provides such an environment because it offers investors more
anonymity than a traditional human broker. Data on online investors suggest that
they more heavily invest in growth stocks and high-tech companies than do investors
with traditional brokerage accounts (Barber and Odean 2001, 2002). Such stocks are
often associated with higher ambiguity in the finance literature. Konana and
Balasubramanian (2005) find that many investors use both traditional and online
brokerage accounts, and hold more speculative online portfolios. One of the
investors they interviewed noted in the context of online trading (p. 518): “I don’t
have to explain why I want to buy the stock.”
6 Conclusion
Fear of negative evaluation (FNE) has been proposed in the literature as a factor that
increases ambiguity aversion. It was, however, not known to what extent ambiguity
aversion can exist beyond FNE. We have introduced an experimental design in
which preferences between outcomes are private information, so that others cannot
judge the goodness of decisions and outcomes. Thus, we can completely control the
presence or absence of FNE and investigate its role. In our experiment, ambiguity
aversion completely disappears if FNE disappears. This shows that FNE is more
important than has commonly been thought and that it may even be necessary for
ambiguity aversion to arise.
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Appendix
A1. Instructions experiment 1
(Please report your NAME and EMAIL here:
________________________________________
________________________________________
A researcher from the Economics Department may contact you to ask for some
explanations concerning your choice.)
Consider the following two hypothetical lottery options:
Option A gives you a draw from a bag that contains exactly 40 poker chips. They
are either red or green, in an unknown proportion. Before you draw, you choose one
color. Then you draw. If the color you have chosen matches the color you draw you
win €16. If the colors do not match, you get nothing.
Option B gives you a draw from a bag that contains exactly 20 red and 20 green
poker chips. Before you draw, you choose one color. Then you draw. If the color you
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have chosen matches the color you draw you win €15. If the colors do not match,
you get nothing.
Imagine you had a choice between these two lottery options. Which one would
you choose?
O Option A (bet on a color to win €16 from bag with unknown proportion of colors)
O Option B (bet on a color to win €15 from bag with 20 red and 20 green chips)
A2. Instructions experiment 2
In Treatments KS and US the instructions started with the following part:
In front of you there are twoDVDs: About a Boy and Catch Me if You Can. Take your
time to have a look at the boxes and then decide which one you would like to receive.
Write down the name of your preferred movie here:
________________________________________
Please also write down your name and movie preference in the list the
experimenter will give to you.
In Treatments KC and UC this part was replaced by the following text:
In front of you there are two DVDs: About a Boy and Catch Me if You Can. Take
your time to have a look at the boxes and then decide which one you would like to
receive, but do not tell your preference to the experimenter.
In Treatments KS and US the first part was followed by the following text:
Next, the experimenter will give you two stickers, one with a cross on it, and one with
a circle on it. Please attach one of these stickers to each of the DVDs as you like. The
symbol (cross or circle) has nothing to do with your preference between the movies.
Then the experimenter will offer you a choice to draw a card from either of two
stacks of cards: this card is used to determine which DVD you will win. This is done
as follows:
On each card there are numbers 1 to 6 and either a cross or a circle next to each
number (see example card). After drawing a card you will throw a six-sided die to
determine the winning number and thereby the winning symbol: cross or circle. You
obtain the DVD to which you attached the winning symbol before the game.
The two stacks of cards.
One stack of cards, called “50–50”, contains cards that each have exactly three
crosses and three circles on the back, randomly distributed over the six numbers of
the die, e.g. 1: x, 2: 0, 3: 0, 4: x, 5: 0, 6: x.
The other stack of cards, called “?”, contains cards that have an unknown number
of crosses and circles on the back, but the sum of the number of the two symbols is
equal to six again: that is, there are between zero and six crosses on the back,
distributed randomly over the six numbers of the die, and a complementary number
of circles, e.g. 1: x, 2: 0, 3: 0, 4: x, 5: 0, 6: 0.
Summary and timeline: you receive the two stickers → you attach the cross and
circle sticker to the DVDs as you like → draw a card from the 50–50-stack or from
the ?-stack → throw the die and observe which symbol wins → take the DVD to
which you attached this symbol. End of the experiment.
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Please carefully consider all the information given to you about the chances of the
two stacks of cards and your personal preferences between the DVDs, before
making your choice between a draw from the 50–50-stack or the ?-stack of cards.
In Treatments KC and UC the first part was followed by the following text:
Next the experimenter will give you two stickers, one with a cross on it, and
one with a circle on it. He will also give you €10 to be used during the game.
Please attach each one of these stickers to each of the two DVDs as you like. The
symbol (cross or circle) has nothing to do with your preference between the
movies.
Then the experimenter will offer you a costly choice to draw a card from either of
two stacks of cards (you have to choose one and can use the €10 to pay for it): this
card is used to determine which DVD you will win. This is done as follows:
On each card there are numbers 1 to 6 and either a cross or a circle next to each
number (see example card). After drawing a card you will throw a six-sided die to
determine the winning number and thereby the winning symbol, cross or circle. You
obtain the DVD to which you attached the winning symbol before the game.
The two stacks of cards.
One stack of cards, called “50–50”, contains cards that each have exactly three
crosses and three circles on the back, randomly distributed over the six numbers of
the die, e.g. 1: x, 2: 0, 3: 0, 4: x, 5: 0, 6: x. To draw a card from the 50–50-stack
costs you €9.70 of your €10 endowment (the rest is yours).
The other stack of cards, called “?”, contains cards that have an unknown number
of crosses and circles on the back, but the sum of the number of the two symbols is
equal to six again: that is, there are between zero and six crosses on the back,
distributed randomly over the six numbers of the die, and a complementary number
of circles, e.g. 1: x, 2: 0, 3: 0, 4: x, 5: 0, 6: 0. To draw a card from the ?-stack costs
you €9.20 of your €10 endowment (the rest is yours).
Summary and timeline: you receive two stickers and €10 → you attach the cross
and circle sticker to the DVDs as you like → draw a card from the 50–50-stack for
€9.70 or from the ?-stack for €9.20 and use the €10 to pay for it→ throw the die and
observe which symbol wins → take the DVD to which you attached this symbol.
End of the experiment.
Please carefully consider all the information given to you about the chances and
the prices of the two stacks of cards, and your personal preferences between the
DVDs, before making your choice between a draw from the 50–50-stack or the ?-
stack of cards.
A3. Results of experiment 2 if indifferences are excluded
We defined a subject as indifferent if either her valuation difference was zero or she
explicitly indicated that she was indifferent in the unknown preference condition. In
Treatments KS and KC a subject could therefore be indifferent only if her valuation
difference equals zero, while in Treatment US and UC either condition could apply.
This leads to relatively more indifferences in the unknown preference treatments. We
chose this measure of indifference to restrict the data to subjects with a clear
preference and make sure we eliminated any possible bias owing to indifferences.
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Table 6 summarizes the results of the four treatments. It shows the percentage of
subjects choosing the unambiguous prospect.
Excluding indifferent subjects, the average valuation difference between the two
DVDs was slightly higher at €2.66, and there was no significant effect of known
versus unknown preference on valuation differences. Therefore, excluding indifferent
subjects does not lead to any relevant changes in the probit results; see Table 7.
A4. Instructions experiment 3
On the table in front of you there are two bags. Each of them contains 40 poker chips
which can be red or green. Bag one (white) contains exactly 20 red and 20 green poker
chips. Bag two (beige) contains an unknown proportion of red and green chips.
First you will be called upon to make two choices. You will be asked to choose
the bag from which you want to draw. You will also indicate the color on which you
want to bet. You will indicate the choices on the decision sheet.
The other people participating in the experiment will make choices analogous to yours.
Second, when everybody has made his or her decisions and indicated them on the
decision sheet, you will be invited to announce your decisions in front of the
experimenter and the other people present, and to draw a chip from the bag you have
chosen. If the chip you draw from the bag is of the color you have indicated, you
will immediately be paid €15; if it is of the other color you receive nothing.
The order in which everybody announces his or her decisions and draws from his or
her preferred bag will be randomly determined. Chips that are drawn will immediately
be replaced in the bag such that the proportions do not change for the next person.
Table 7 Probit regression without indifferences
Probit Dependent variable: choice of risky prospect
I II III
Unknown −0.3232 (0.0868)** −0.339 (0.0873)** −0.3578 (0.1003)**
Price −0.2094 (0.0917)* −0.2149 (0.0931)* −0.1512 (0.1196)
Valuation difference (ex-post) 0.0202 (0.0239)
Controls (gender, age) Yes Yes
Number of observations 118 117 90
The table reports marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses.
*Significant at the 5% level
**Significant at the 1% level, two-sided
Table 6 Percentage of risky choices without indifferences
Same price Ambiguous Card 50c Cheaper
Known preference Treatment KS (N=36)
69% chose risky card (>50%, p=0.014)
Treatment KC (N=28)
43% chose risky card (not significant)
Unknown preference Treatment US (N=29)
31% chose risky card (<50%, p=0.031)
Treatment UC (N=25)
20% chose risky card (<50%, p=0.002)
Tests are binomial.
KS: Known preference with Same price; KC, US, and UC refer to the other cells
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After everybody has drawn from a bag, you will obtain the €10 from the first
experiment, the €15 from the second experiment if you won it, and sign a receipt;
then you can leave the room.
Please, no conversations during the experiment!
Decision sheet
Choice Task:
Please indicate the bag you want to draw from:
O bag 1 (20 red and 20 green chips) or O bag 2 (unknown proportion)
Please indicate the color that you bet you will draw from your chosen bag:
O red chip or O green chip
Additional hypothetical question:
Imagine you had to pay for the right to participate in a draw from the
aforementioned bags with the possibility to win €15. How much would you pay
for the right to participate in the prospects? Please indicate your valuations:
I would pay _________ € to participate in a draw from bag 1 (20 red and 20 green
chips).
I would pay _________ € to participate in a draw from bag 2 (unknown proportion).
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